

Page Denied

Next 1 Page(s) In Document Denied

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The Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D.C. 20505

11 OCT 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR: John S. Foster, Jr.
Seymour Weiss
President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board

SUBJECT : Study Proposals in your 4 September 1984 Memo

1. Thank you for your comments on our recent deception conference. I, too, am quite pleased that we were able to bring together so many deception experts to deliberate this important subject for several days. Again, I appreciate the contributions that both of you brought to the conference, and I welcome your suggestions for follow-up studies. [redacted]

25X1 2. As you know, we will be publishing conference proceedings. We also plan a concerted follow-up based on our internal review of the full range of conference implications. The Foreign Intelligence Capabilities Group (FICG) is currently conducting this review and preparing some recommendations for me. I would like to consider your proposals within the framework of FICG's more comprehensive approach to the whole deception problem. [redacted]

25X1 3. I value your suggestions and believe all three proposals have merit. However, all will require better definition before we can proceed, and I welcome your additional thoughts on each. Let me indicate the general direction I believe we should be moving in, and invite your further suggestions about each of these proposals. [redacted]

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[REDACTED]

5. Deception in arms control talks is an important issue and a potentially lucrative research area. A careful study of this subject would be a labor-intensive project, and we should begin with a much clearer picture of what we are looking for. I would welcome your specific suggestions to help us formulate some testable hypotheses which we can compare with the written record.

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6. Soviet disinformation in the public arena surely emerged as one of the major themes at the conference. As you know, I have been concerned about this problem even before I accepted this position as DCI. The problem is difficult, but not intractable.

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[REDACTED]

But we need to do more. While this is not primarily a problem of intelligence deception, I believe that deception analysis can make an important contribution to our efforts against active measures. Soviet deception activities target public opinion in the US and elsewhere in the West, including select elite audiences in the arms control and scientific communities, the media, and even Congress itself.

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[REDACTED]

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7. [] will serve as my point of contact on these issues and for our other follow-up activities related to the conference. Please contact him [] at your convenience. []

Bill
William J. Casey

*In addition we are working up
a conference on the semantics & psychology
of disinformation & active measures
& political propaganda
MJC*

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-3-
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- 11 - C/ACIS
- 12 - CRES Chrono
- 13 - FICG Chrono
- 14 - FICG Subject

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